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1 Introduction
Severance pay may induce the desired level of turnover by increasing the cost
of ring the incumbent manager, thus representing a credible commitment to
reduce the ring probability (Almazan and Suarez 2003). Alternatively, it may
induce a "bad" manager to resign by making quitting more attractive than con-
tinuation (Inderst and Mueller, 2010). Hence, severance pay may cause either
the manager or the board to behave optimally. Some authors however, point
out that severance pay, by insulating the manager from the consequences of
poor performance, is simply a "reward for failure" that violates the pay-for-
performance principle of agency theory (see for example Bebchuk and Fried
2004). Critics of executive compensation and severance agreements have grown
more numerous during the recent nancial crisis, when controversial compen-
sation practices have resulted in very generous bonuses and severance packages
for top executives, even if rms were su¤ering severe losses. Some commenta-
tors went further, pointing at the perverse incentive e¤ects of the structure of
executive compensations in the nancial sector as one of the causes of the 2008
crisis.1
In the present paper we show that severance pay, if related to performance,
may be a useful tool in incentive compensation. 2 We consider a simple model
where rm s pro ts derive from both routine activity and an investment project.
Severance pay contingent on returns results from optimal contracting when a
board hires a manager of unknown ability who has to exert unobservable e¤ort
to select the investment. If the manager is subsequently found to be low-ability,
the board wants to replace him with a (possibly) high-ability manager. Pro ts
depend both on manager s ability (hence on board s ability to detect it through
monitoring) and on the investment project (hence on unobservable managerial
e¤ort). Thus, the contract must induce the manager to exert e¤ort. This is
easily accomplished by incentive pay if the manager is retained. However, if the
manager anticipates that he may later be red, he may not nd it in his interest
to exert a high enough level of e¤ort. Our focus is on the tension between
these two objectives: ring a low-ability manager and simultaneously giving
the manager appropriate incentives independently of his type. Severance pay
alleviates this con ict: by compensating for the gains that the manager would
enjoy if retained, it insulates him from the disadvantages of ring.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes monitoring, Section 4 illustrates managerial choice of e¤ort
while Section 5 presents the optimal contract. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1See, for instance, the discussion in Faulkender et al. (2010).
2A similar point is made by Cowen et al. (2016) who suggest that rms include triggering
conditions that specify minimum performance standards.
2 The model
Consider a board that needs to hire a manager of unknown ability both to
run routine activities and to undertake a risky project. Whether the ability of
the manager is high ( ) or low ( ) depends on his matching with the rm.
Consequently, the manager himself is not aware of his type when hired, so that
no screening is possible. The probability that he ends up being high-ability is
with 0 1.
The rm s returns from routine activity depend on the manager s type and
are veri able. Returns are 0 (0) if the manager is high-ability (low-ability),
resulting in expected return . In addition to "business as usual", a risky
investment project can be undertaken, but unobservable e¤ort 2 [0 1] at cost
2
2 must be exerted by the manager to identify such opportunity. E¤ort enables
the manager to identify the project with probability With probability 1¡ the
project is not identi ed and the manager only performs routine activities. The
project o¤ers a veri able return 0 (independent of manager s type) with
probability and zero return with complementary probability. The investment
also o¤ers private bene ts 0 to the manager provided that he is not red.
Only after the manager has spent some time on the job, the board can assess
his type through uncontractible monitoring. A monitoring intensity 2 [0 1]
costs 2 2 and allows the board to learn the manager s ability with probability
¸ 0. Following monitoring, the board makes a report bon the manager s type,
b= b b. Then, on the basis of this report and of the ring rule (b) speci ed
in the contract between the board and the manager, the latter is either retained
or red. Since the ring/retention decision is observable and veri able, (b) 2
f0 1g Values of (b) 2 (0 1) are ruled out because their implementation
would not be veri able. We assume that the managers pool is large enough
for the probability of a high-ability replacement to remain We also assume
that there are no ring costs other than severance pay and that, in the event of
ring, the new manager cannot modify the investment project.
Following the previous literature we assume that both the board and the
manager are risk-neutral and that the latter has no wealth and is protected by
limited liability.3 For simplicity we also assume that the manager s reservation
level of utility is equal to zero. This, together with limited liability, introduces
a double normalization (to zero) which might seem restrictive. It can, however,
be veri ed that introducing a positive level of reservation utility would not
substantially alter our results. The values of the incentive components of the
compensation would be unchanged but a positive uncontingent salary should be
introduced whenever the expected incentive pay is not su¢cient to satisfy the
participation constraint. 4
Manager s compensation can be conditioned on veri able returns and ring
3See Almazan and Suarez (2003), Inderst and Muller (2010).
4A rationale for these assumptions under risk neutrality is discussed by Almazan and
Suarez (2003), footnote 7.
decision, so that the manager may receive severance pay if red. Performance
pay, and possibly severance pay, conditional on return can be added to a
base salary in order to induce a greater e¤ort. Given that the manager cannot
improve his (exogenously given) ability, there is instead no point in conditioning
compensation on . At rst glance, our model may appear separable in the two
activities: business as usual that is rewarded through the base salary, and e¤ort
for the investment project that is rewarded through incentive pay. As far as
pro ts are concerned, however, the two activities are linked. Indeed both the
optimal level of monitoring and the ring probability, which a¤ect expected
returns from routine activity, depend on performance and severance pay.
Given that the reservation utility is normalized to zero and that routine
activity imposes no disutility on the manager, the base salary is equal to zero.
Moreover, limited liability allows to focus on contracts yielding zero payment
when the project return is zero and a non-negative bonus when the project
succeeds. This also guarantees that the participation constraint is not binding.
The bonus is if the manager is retained, and if he is red. Then, severance
pay may be contingent on project success. In the event of ring, no incentive
compensation is paid to the replacement because he cannot modify the project.
For technical reasons we assume5 · 1 (1 ¡ ) and 2 ¡ (1 ¡ )




The timing is as follows:





period 2 : The manager implements e¤ort Possibly, an investment project
is chosen.
period 3 : Upon monitoring, the board learns the manager type with proba-
bility and makes the ring/retention decision.
period 4 : Cash ows are obtained, together with private bene ts if invest-
ment is selected.
3 Monitoring and ring decision
In period 3, once the manager has exerted e¤ort and a project has possibly been
chosen, the board monitors the manager to learn his type that a¤ects routine
pro ts. If a low-ability (high-ability) manager is replaced, the increase (loss)
in expected pro t is ((1 ¡ ) ) because the ability of the replacement is
unknown. For the cases where monitoring is successful (which happens with
probability ), the optimal contract must then prescribe ring (retention) if
low (high) ability is observed, i.e. (b) = 1 and ( b ) = 0 However, the
5These assumptions ensure interior solutions for e¤ort, incentive pay and monitoring thus
simplifying the exposition. They also ensure that incentive compatibility conditions on and
are satis ed. Qualitative results would not be a¤ected by also considering corner solutions
or binding constraints.
decision of the board also depends on the di¤erence between and , and this
creates a link between routine pro ts and incentives for e¤ort. To guarantee that
the board has no incentive to misreport the manager s type given ( b ) = 0
and (b) = 1, and must satisfy the following incentive-compatibility
conditions:
(1¡ ) ¸ ( ¡ ) (1)
¸ ( ¡ ) (2)
Condition (1) guarantees that the expected cost from ring a high-ability man-
ager, (1¡ ) , is not smaller than the expected cost of retaining him, ( ¡ ).
Such cost is given by the di¤erence between expected bonus if he is retained and
expected severance pay if he is red, when the investment is made. Similarly,
condition (2) guarantees that the gain obtained by ring the low-ability type,
is not o¤set by the di¤erence ( ¡ ).
Consider now the case with unsuccessful monitoring, which happens with
probability 1 ¡ . There is no gain from replacing the manager because the
expected routine pro t would not change. Expected routine pro t is then in-
dependent of ring probability. The expected return from investment, instead,
depends on the compensation paid to the manager in case of success. Hence, the
corresponding incentive compatible ring probability, (b0) ´ will depend
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(3)
The optimal values of , and will be determined in Section 6. For
the moment su¢ce it to note that the values of and contained in the
contract satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3) respectively
The board chooses to maximize expected pro ts:
f [ + (1¡ ) ] + (1¡ )
+
£





where the two terms in the rst line represent routine expected pro ts, 2
f0 1g is an indicator function taking value 1 if a risky project has been selected
and value 0 otherwise, and the following term in square brackets represents the
expected return from a risky project. When a risky project is undertaken,
( ) is paid if the manager is discovered to be high-ability (low-ability) or if the
contract prescribes retention ( ring) in case of unsuccessful monitoring.
From the rst-order condition we obtain:
=
©
(1¡ ) + (1¡ ¡ )( ¡ )
ª
(4)
Monitoring increases in the expected gain from replacing a bad with a good
manager, . Given that must satisfy (3), the level of monitoring is the
highest when a risky project is not undertaken ( = 0) or when a project is
implemented and = . In such cases, monitoring intensity simpli es to:
= (1¡ ) ´ (5)
This high-lights one aspect of the con ict between monitoring and incentives
for project choice. Whenever incentives for e¤ort require to set 6= , the
level of monitoring must be reduced with respect to (5) to preserve incentive
compatibility in the ring decision.
4 Managerial e¤ort
The manager does not know his own type when deciding the level of but can
anticipate the value of , and calculate the ex ante ring probability in case
the investment is undertaken,
´ (1¡ ) + (1¡ ) = + (1¡ ¡ ) (6)
The manager then solves:
f (1¡ ) + + (1¡ )g ¡
2
2
From the FOC we obtain :
= [ (1¡ ) + ] + (1¡ ) (7)
Managerial e¤ort increases in expected monetary compensation and private ben-
e ts. The expectation for monetary compensation is taken with respect to the
probability of project success. When the project succeeds, the bonus is if
the manager is con rmed (i.e. with probability 1 ¡ ) and if he is red (i.e.
with probability ). Private bene ts instead are obtained only if the manager
remains with the rm. Since monetary compensation and private bene ts are
substitutes in motivating e¤ort, the board will choose the combination of
and that makes it cheaper to provide incentives, considering the e¤ect on
monitoring and ring probability.
5 Optimal monetary compensation




, anticipating the subsequent
choice of and . We know that ( b ) = 0 and (b) = 1, so that we only
have to determine The board solves :










where is given by (7) and ¡ and satisfy (1) (2 ), (3). Recall that
represents the level of monitoring when a risky project is undertaken (see
(4)) whereas is the level of monitoring when no investment is selected (see
(5)). Then, the rst term is the expected return from the investment, is the
expected routine pro t from a high-ability manager, and the third and fourth
terms (depending on monitoring) represent the expected routine pro t from a
low-ability manager. The following Proposition characterizes the solution





= + and = 0
Proof. See Appendix.
Severance pay is strictly positive and larger than incentive pay. must
be 0 for the contract to be incentive-compatible If were positive, the board
would in fact have an incentive to report high ability even when it is uninformed.
Using Proposition 1 we obtain
= (1¡ )[ ¡ ]
and
= (1¡ ) = (1¡ )2[ ¡ ]
where is lower than and is lower than the ex-ante ring probability in
the absence of an investment, ´ (1¡ )2 This is summarized in
Proposition 2. When managerial e¤ort is successful, monitoring and the
resulting ex ante ring probability are optimally reduced.
Severance pay introduces a distortion in the level of monitoring, and
consequently in the ex-ante ring probability which is reduced with respect to
the case with no investment. This, on the one hand, reduces expected routine
pro ts but, on the other hand, increases the expected value of private bene-
ts, (1¡ ) providing ex ante incentives for managerial e¤ort. Moreover, by
compensating the manager for the loss of private bene ts, severance pay
insulates him from the replacement policy when the project is successful.
6 Conclusions
We have considered a board of directors that monitors a manager to assess his
ability, and possibly dismiss him, in a context where managerial e¤ort is needed
to undertake a risky project. E¤ort is low if the manager anticipates that he
might be red, so that a con ict arises between monitoring and incentives.
Such con ict is solved introducing a contingent severance pay which results
in a reduction in monitoring and ring. Moreover, severance pay insulates
the manager from the adverse consequences of ring. Thus, we contribute to
literature on the advantages of some managerial entrenchment.
We suggest that severance pay aimed at providing incentives should be re-
lated to performance. Though severance provisions are usually independent of
performance, several discretionary items are paid upon separation in addition
to those contracted when the manager is hired (see for example Yermak (2006)
and Cowen et al. (2016)). These items (usually cash payments, new awards of
stock or options, consulting agreements that will be paid over a number of years)
may provide di¤erent payments depending on rm performance. Moreover, in
analogy to what has been suggested for bonuses, clawbacks clauses allowing the
rm to recover payments in case of negative performance could be introduced
also for severance pay (see for example Bell and van Reenen 2014).
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8 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
By substituting for and from (4) and (5) into (8) and solving s.t. (7), (3)
we obtain the following FOCs. We ignore (1), (2) because it will be clear that
they are satis ed by the solutions.
: ( + ) + [ + ] = 0 (9)
: ( + ) + [ + ] = 0 (10)
where
´ [ ¡ (1¡ )¡ ] (11)
´





(1¡ )¡ ( ¡ )
¸
¡ = ¡ ¡ (13)
=
·
¡ ( ¡ )
¸
¡ = ¡ ¡ (14)
= (1¡ ¡ ) = ¡(1¡ ¡ ) = ¡ (15)
= (1¡ ¡ ) = ¡ (16)
Summing up (9) and (10) and substituting for the derivatives we obtain:
+ = (17)
Substituting (17) and (13)¡(16) into (9), and considering that = [ (1¡ )¡ ]
we have
(1¡ ¡ ) = (1¡ )¡ (18)
Substituting (4) with = 1 into (18) and considering that must satisfy
(3) we obtain:
¡ = and = 0
Considering (11) (12), (7) and substituting for ¡ in (17) we obtain:
=
2
¡
2
¡
(1¡ )2
2
+
2(1¡ )2
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